Martin Middlebrook (2003, revised from the 1988 edition). The author was generously given time and interviews by many Argentine combatants, but received no help from their air force. He relied heavily on Falklands – The Air War, a comprehensive book concerning all aircraft in the conflict.
It is enlightening to read about the conflict (April-June 1982) from the Argentine perspective.
In mid-January 1982 a Working Party met at Army HQ in the Liberatador Building, Buenos Aires.Members were Vice-Admiral Lombardo, General Osvaldo Garcia of the Army and Brigadier-General Siegfriedo Plessl of the Air Force. They expected planning to be complete by 15 September: by then HMS Endurance would be withdrawn, the training of conscripts would be well advanced and the re-equipment of the Naval Air Arm with Super Étendard aircraft and weapons would be completed.
However, events dictated otherwise. Scrap metal merchants landed on South Georgia (a Dependency of the Falkland Islands) without obtaining permission which created an international incident. As the talks between Argentina and Great Britain concerning the Falklands were not going anywhere, the Argentine junta decided to bring forward their ‘repossession’ plans to force the British Government’s hand...
Ships started loading at 8am on 28 March at Puerto Belgrano...
Troops were warned that there was to be no excesses against the enemy troops, women or private property when they ‘took back’ the islands. It was considered as a semi-religious crusade – even renaming the Operation Blue after the Virgin Mary’s robe.
Many soldiers experienced ‘an excess of joy’ to be involved – (p65).
However, a senior Argentine army officer considered the enterprise ‘a crazy expedition by demented people. It was stupid to offend a big country like Britain...’ (p17).
So, on 2 April the seaborne Argentine attack resulted in the taking of the Falkland Islands with very little loss of life.
On 3 April, a platoon of the First Marine Infantry Battalion on the frigate Guerrico set out to Grytviken (South Georgia) which was manned by about 22 Royal Marines. The marines put up a fight, but inevitably outgunned with superior numbers had to surrender.
In remarkably quick time, the British Task Force sailed, a response the Argentines had not expected. A British Exclusion Zone was set up...
On 12 April, the EEC embargo on trade and help came into effect: French technicians linked to the Super Étendards were due but were cancelled. The Argentines had only five aircraft and five Exocet aircraft-missiles.
Of the criticism of the sinking of the Belgrano on 2 May, Middlebrook considers it ‘humbug’ – and Captain Bonzo of that ill-fated ship agrees: ‘By no means do I have any feelings of anger’ (p116). In effect, once Argentine aircraft attacked RN ships on 1 May, war had begun and the 200-mile exclusion zone no longer applied, and the Belgrano was carrying 400 troops (a quarter died).
After the sinking, the Argentine fleet stayed off Argentina’s shore and did not engage the British.
The Argentine aircraft were up against the phenomenal Harriers as well as ship-born missiles and guns. ‘The whole world would come to admire the gallantry shown by the Argentine pilots’ (p150).
Damage to the RN ships would have been greater save that many bombs that hit the vessels did not explode. The Argentine Skyhawks and Daggers released their bombs when flying too low, not giving the bomb fuses time to arm themselves (p154).
Towards the end, as the Harriers gained air-superiority, the Argentine soldiers on the Falklands felt abandoned: the air force and the navy stood by on the mainland and did little for them, save brave bold re-supply flights into Stanley.
The end was inevitable, perhaps, but many of the Argentine soldiers put up a good fight, even though by then they were mostly demoralised.
Middlebrook obtained many pertinent quotations; here is a sample:
The Argentine padre told the men ‘God would forgive us. We must kill as many British as possible... By then I knew we were being told lies...’ (p274).
‘The junta and people at other levels all lied to the country’ (p290).
‘I have always admired the British, and it made me very sad that the only war I ever fought in was against the British’ (p290)
Many soldiers came to resent their officers more than the British (p275).
A worthy addition to any Falklands War book collection.
Editorial comments:
The author may have miscounted the aircraft-mounted Exocets: ‘No further opportunity occurred for the Argentines to use the remaining three Exocets’ (p247).
And yet: Two Exocets fired (p124) – one hit the Sheffield, which sunk; the second missed. Three left. Two Super Étendards fired Exocets and one hit the Atlantic Conveyor (p174). One left. On p202 it is admitted there is only one Exocet left.
‘The
deer had been originally introduced to the island for sport-shooting purposes
(p11). However, when I went to South Georgia (in 1985) I was told that the deer
were introduced to vary the whalers’ diet. Culling was necessary from time to time
to keep the numbers down and in 2013 teams of Norwegian government shooters and
reindeer herders culled all 3,500 reindeer on the island.
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